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A well-known method of validating economet-
ric models (structural or otherwise) is to examine 
their performance in out-of-sample prediction. 
That is, given a change in the policy environment, 
do the key endogenous variables of the model 
move in ways that are in some sense “reasonably 
close” to the model’s forecasts? Unfortunately, 
however,  as  noted  by  Keane  and  Kenneth  I. 
Wolpin (forthcoming), the examination of mod-
els’ predictive validity is not especially common 
in the microeconometrics literature.
A common feature of structural econometric 
models is that latent variables, not observed and 
therefore not fit by the model, are key determi-
nants of agents’ behavior. For example, in Keane 
and Wolpin (2001), parental transfers to college-
aged youth are key drivers of college attendance 
decisions.  Policy  changes  affect  attendance 
partly through their effect on transfers. Yet their 
model is not actually fit to parental transfers, 
as these are unobserved in their data. Instead 
they are a latent variable (inferred from income, 
changes in assets, etc.). Thus, while Keane and 
Wolpin (2001) can check if policies affect col-
lege  attendance  as  their  model  predicts,  they 
cannot  directly  test  the  policy-to-transfers-to-
behavior mechanism embedded in the model.
Here, we suggest one approach to validating 
structural econometric models is to seek evi-
dence that such latent behavioral mechanisms 
embedded  in  a  model  are  in  fact  operative. 
Of course, this requires collecting data on the 
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  relevant latent variable(s).
1 We present an exam-
ple of this idea motivated by Ahmed Khwaja’s 
(2001) structural model of health over the life 
cycle.  In  the  model,  agents  make  sequential 
decisions on health insurance, health invest-
ments  (preventive  care  and  healthy/unhealthy 
behaviors), and medical treatment. Estimation 
uses the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). 
Simulation of the model generates the surpris-
ing  result  that  provision  of  free  health  insur-
ance would not cause people to engage in more 
risky behaviors like drinking and smoking, or 
to engage less in healthy behaviors like exercise. 
This runs counter to the usual “moral hazard” 
story in static insurance models, where insur-
ance induces more risky behavior.
The point is that, in a dynamic model, bet-
ter insurance may increase life expectancy, as 
it allows one to afford more preventive care and 
better treatment in the event of illness. Increased 
life expectancy, in turn, enhances one’s incentive 
to invest in health (i.e., in any dynamic model, 
a longer planning horizon—in this case, life-
span—increases  returns  to  investment).
2 This 
dynamic effect counteracts the static moral haz-
ard effect of insurance on investment in health.
We call the mechanism where greater life 
expectancy  increases  investment  in  health  the 
“Mickey Mantle effect,” after the great Yankee 
slugger of the 1950s and 1960s. Mantle was a phe-
nomenal natural talent. But a string of   injuries, 
combined with heavy drinking and serious disre-
gard for his health, ended his career prematurely. 
After years of alcoholism leading ultimately to 
1 Keane and Wolpin (2001) did examine historical data 
on transfers from other sources, and they argue that quali-
tatively it follows the patterns predicted by their model. 
But the additional data were inadequate to test directly the 
policy-to-transfers-to-schooling behavioral mechanism. 
2 More intuitively, if one expects to live longer, it creates 
an incentive to invest in health to enhance quality of life 
in old age. On the other hand, the expectation of greater 
longevity can also reduce the marginal value of additional 
years of life, a mechanism that would reduce investment in 
health. In Khwaja’s model the investment increasing effects 
of a greater expected life span dominate. 
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liver failure, Mantle died of cancer at the age of 
63. He explained his reckless behavior by not-
ing he never expected to live past his early 40s, 
as most males on his father’s side died young 
due to Hodgkin’s disease.
3 He was surprised to 
live into his 60s, and observed: “If I knew I was 
going to live this long, I’d have taken better care 
of myself.”
4
Khwaja’s  model  predicts  that  if  we  could 
observe the latent variable life expectancy, we 
would see the Mantle effect, a ceteris paribus 
positive effect of life expectancy on investment 
in health. If this effect were not present, it would 
cast serious doubt on the validity of the model, 
while if it were present, we would gain addi-
tional confidence in the model.
The  HRS  collects  data  on  subjective  life 
expectancy. Our goal is to seek evidence of the 
Mantle effect using these data, by estimating 
health investment decision rules that include life 
expectancy.
5 Of course, life expectancy may be 
endogenous in the decision rule for investment 
in health, for two reasons. The first is reverse 
causality:  investment  in  health  increases  life 
expectancy.  The  second  is  omitted  variables: 
a healthier person, ceteris paribus, expects to 
live longer and therefore has a greater return to 
investments that increase quality of life in old 
age. Thus, inadequate controls for health may 
create spurious correlation between life expec-
tancy and health investment. Moreover, survey 
questions  presumably  measure  subjective  life 
expectancy with considerable error.
To clarify, consider the following simple sche-
matic representation of Khwaja’s model:
  (A)  Investment  in  health  5  f  (lagged  health, 
price of investment in health, income, taste 
for health, life expectancy).
3 Mantle’s father died of Hodgkin’s disease at the age 
of 39, while his two uncles died at 32 and 41 years of age. 
Of Mantle’s four sons, one died of Hodgkin’s disease a 
year before Mantle (at the age of 36), while the other died 
of cancer in 2000. Mantle’s two surviving sons are active 
in the Mickey Mantle Foundation, which promotes organ 
donations.
4 This could be ex post rationalization, but Mantle made 
related statements in his youth, e.g., as a rookie he told the 
player representative: “You don’t have to talk to me about 
pensions. I won’t be around long enough to collect one.”
5 In principle, Khwaja might have used these data in esti-
mation, but modeling expectations entails great difficulties.
  (B)  Life expectancy 5 g (lagged health, price 
of health care, investment in health, envi-
ronmental  risk  factors,  genetic/hereditary 
factors).
  (C)  Current health 5 h (lagged health, invest­
ment in health, environmental risk factors, 
genetic/hereditary factors, exogenous shocks 
to health).
  (D)  Insurance coverage 5 I (lagged health, insur-
ance plan options, income, risk aversion, taste 
for health, tastes for insurance plan options).
Our interest is in estimating (A). Assume the 
error term in (A) arises because of the “taste 
for health,” and some part of lagged health is 
unobserved. According to (B), life expectancy 
is affected by investment in health. Thus, life 
expectancy is endogenous in (A), as a person 
with a high unobserved taste for health and/or 
higher  than  observed  lagged  health  will  tend 
to have both a high rate of investment in health 
and  high  life  expectancy  (creating  spurious 
correlation).
A valid instrument for life expectancy in (A) 
is a variable that affects investment in health 
only through its affect on life expectancy (and 
not through any other channel). In the system 
(A)–(D), one’s genetic/hereditary health endow-
ment  plays  this  role.  Thus,  motivated  by  the 
Mantle story, we instrument for subjective life 
expectancy using parents’ age at death (or cur-
rent ages if still alive), which serves as a proxy for 
the health endowment.
6, 
7 Of course, the assump-
tion that genetic/hereditary factors do not enter 
(A) directly is a strong one, but we think it is not 
6 According  to  the  framework  (A)–(D),  measures  of 
environmental risk factors are also potential instruments. 
Living in a risky environment may reduce life expectancy, 
but  conditional  on  life  expectancy  it  should  not  affect 
investment in health directly. Of course, this assumes that 
risky environment is not endogenous in the sense that peo-
ple with low tastes for health will also choose to live in a 
risky environment.
7 After  completing  this  work  we  became  aware  of  a 
recent paper by David E. Bloom et al. (2006) which uses 
similar instruments to estimate effects of life expectancy 
on saving and the timing of retirement.VOL. 97 NO. 2 55 TESTING ThE MEChANISMS Of STRuCTuRAL MODELS




We use the first six waves (1992–2002) of 
the HRS, which began as a panel study of the   
1931 through 1941 US birth cohorts (see www.
hrsonline.isr.umich.edu). Participants in the first 
wave ranged from 51 to 61 years old, and were 
reinterviewed every two years. Spouses received 
an identical interview and could be of any age. 
In 1998, new cohorts born between 1942 and 
1947  were  added.  We  restrict  our  sample  to 
all persons age 51 to 65 at the interview date 
who  had  complete  information.
10 Our  depen-
dent variables are binary indicators for whether 
a respondent currently smokes, drinks heavily 
(average of three or more drinks per day), or is 
obese (Body Mass Index . 30). Our analysis 
sample contains 44,238 observations (which is 
reduced to 43,963 for the smoking regression, as 
this variable is missing for 275 cases).
Our measure of subjective life expectancy is 
a respondent’s assessment of the percent chance 
he/she will live to age 75 or longer. Prior studies   
8  Our  key  identifying  assumption  is  that  investment 
is  conditionally  mean  independent  of  the  genetic  health 
endowment,  given  the  controls  in  (A)—i.e.,  life  expec-
tancy, measured health, income, and prices. But a family 
history of congenital disease might affect investment in 
health through other channels (e.g., having fewer financial 
resources in youth if parents were ill). It can be plausibly 
argued that this problem is resolved by conditioning on 
current health status in (A), however, as this would control 
for effects of family background on prior investments in 
health.
9 Insurance  coverage  may  tend  to  be  correlated  with 
unobserved tastes for health. Thus, there may be a selection 
bias whereby people with greater taste for health also have 
more comprehensive insurance (and, hence, a lower cost of 
investment in health). In that case, consistent estimation of 
(A) would require us to deal with this selection problem. 
That, in turn, would require estimating (A) jointly with the 
choice model for insurance coverage in (D).
10 In the HRS wave 1–6, there were 56,567 observa-
tions in the 51–65 age range. Of these, 7,564 were dropped 
because of missing information on longevity expectations, 
3,087 because of missing information on age and death of 
parents, and 1,557 because they had not answered the ques-
tion about risk aversion. In addition, 26 observations had 
missing information on education, 48 on birth region, and 
38 had nonresponses to questions on worsening of health 
conditions, giving an analysis sample of 44,238. There are 
275 missing observations for the smoking question.
show that such longevity probabilities are rea-
sonable predictors of actual longevity.
11 Control 
variables include the respondents’ age, gender, 
race,  ethnicity,  and  marital  status,  household 
income, net household wealth, education, indi-
cators for whether the respondents’ father and 
mother had high school diplomas, and a measure 
of relative risk aversion (see Robert B. Barsky et 
al. 1997).
12
We control for health using a detailed set of 
health  indicators.  These  include  self-assessed 
health (i.e., excellent, very good or better, good 
or better, or fair or better), as well as a large 
number of objective measures such as whether 
the respondent had a recent overnight stay in a 
hospital, the number of limitations in activities 
of daily living (ADLs),
13 and binary indicators 
for whether the respondent was ever diagnosed 
with  hypertension,  diabetes,  cancer,  lung  dis-
ease, heart problems, stroke, mental disease, or 
arthritis/rheumatism. We also include a number 
of variables measuring changes in health status 
since the last interview, and binary variables set 
to one if any of the health measures is missing.
Our instruments include the age at death of 
respondents’ parents (or their current age if still 
alive), as well as age
2, age
3, and binary indica-
tors of whether the father or mother died at an 
age that fell in the range of ,65, 66 to 70, 71 to 
75, 76 to 80, 81 to 85, or 861.
Table A1 (in the Web Appendix available at 
www.e-aer.org/data/may07/P07034_app.pdf) 
contains a complete list of variables used in the 
analysis, along with means and standard devia-
tions.  Fifty-eight  percent  of  respondents  are 
female. The average age is 58 years old and 65 
percent expect to live to age 751; 78 percent 
report being in good or better health, while 49 
percent report very good or better. The average 
11 See Michael D. Hurd and Kathleen McGarry 1995, 
2002; V. Kerry Smith, Donald H. Taylor, Jr., and Frank A. 
Sloan 2001; and Khwaja, Silverman, and Sloan 2006.
12 Note  that  the  variables  “price  of  investments  in 
health” in (A) and “price of health care” in (B) depend 
on prices of alcohol and tobacco, proximity to and cost of 
healthful food, proximity to athletic facilities, etc., as well 
as insurance coverage. We do not measure these variables 
directly, but instead proxy for them using time and region 
dummies (determinants of prices) and variables like edu-
cation, income, and risk tolerance (which drive insurance 
coverage).
13  ADLs are whether the individual is able to walk, dress, 
bathe, eat, get into bed, and use the toilet independently.MAY 2007 56 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
age  at  death  of  respondents’  mothers  is  74.4 
while that of fathers was 70.7.
14
II.  Empirical Results
Given the large number of health measures, 
interpreting their coefficients in regressions for 
life expectancy or health investment is difficult. 
Thus,  we  conduct  a  factor  analysis  described 
in Table A3 in the Web Appendix. We kept the 
first four factors, which explain the bulk of the 
covariance among the health indicators. Factor 
1 is by far the most important. It is a poor health 
factor  with  large  negative  loadings  on  self-
reported health and large positive loadings on 
the  physician-diagnosed  conditions.  Factors  2 
through 4 are all positive health factors whose 
interpretation is subtler.
15
Table 1 reports the first-stage results from two- 
stage least squares (2SLS). The dependent vari-
able is expected probability of living to age 751. 
The first column reports results using the four 
health factors, while the second column includes 
all the separate health indicators from Table A1.
Clearly, health factor 1 is a far more impor-
tant  determinant  of  life  expectancy  than  the 
other factors. A one standard deviation increase 
in (poor) health factor 1 reduces expected prob-
ability of living to age 751 by (–11.058)(0.862) 
5  9.5  percentage  points.  Women’s  subjec-
tive probability of living to 751 is about 3.5 
points greater than men, ceteris paribus, while 
for blacks it is almost 7 points greater than for 
whites. An additional four years of education 
raises  this  probability  more  than  two  points. 
Interestingly, marriage and assets are not sig-
nificant,  and  income,  while  significant,  has  a 
very small effect. The point estimates imply that 
roughly a $300,000 increase in annual income 
is needed to raise the subjective probability by 
just one point.
Parents’ ages at death have large and significant 
effects in the expected direction. For instance, 
having a father who died at the age of 65 or 
14 These figures include current age for parents who are 
still alive (36 percent of mothers and 13 percent of fathers). 
15 Factors 2 and 3 load positively on self-reported health 
but also load positively on stroke indicators. But while fac-
tor 2 loads negatively on the change in self-reported health, 
factor 3 loads positively. Factor 4 loads positively on self-
reported health and negatively on hypertension and diabetes 
indicators. But it also loads positively on ADL limitations.
younger  reduces  the  subjective  probability  of 
living to 751 by 6.6 percentage points, ceteris 
  paribus. The F-test for the joint significance of 
the parental age at death variables is 23.19 in col-
umn 1 and 24.06 in column 2.
16
Table 2 reports OLS regressions of the health 
investment  measures  (smoking,  heavy  drink-
ing,  high  BMI)  on  the  subjective  probability 
of  living  to  age  751,  along  with  controls  for 
socio-demographics and health. (Only the key 
coefficients of “Subj. Prob of living to age 751” 
are reported due to space constraints. See Table 
A2 for the complete set of estimates.) The results 
provide modest support for the Mantle effect. For 
instance, in the smoking regressions in columns 
1–2, subjective probability of living to age 751 
has t-statistics in the 9 to 10 range. The point 
estimates imply a 10 percentage point increase 
in this subjective probability reduces probability 
of smoking by about 1 percentage point.
Point estimates for heavy drinking are highly 
significant, but an order of magnitude smaller. 
The percent of respondents who report heavy 
drinking is also an order of magnitude smaller 
than those who report smoking (see Table A1), 
however, so in percentage terms the effect on 
behavior is similar. For high BMI, our results are 
not significant, statistically or quantitatively.
Table  3  reports  our  main  IV  results  using 
parents’ age at death as an instrument for life 
expectancy. (Only the key coefficients of “Subj. 
prob.  of  living  to  age  751”  are  reported  due 
to space constraints. See Table A4 in the Web 
Appendix  for  the  complete  set  of  estimates.) 
Here, the results are mixed. Those for smoking 
in columns 1–2 seem to provide strong support 
for the Mantle effect. Subjective life expectancy 
is  highly  significant,  and  the  point  estimates 
imply that OLS greatly understates the strength 
of the effect. Specifically, they imply that, ceteris 
paribus, a 10 percentage point increase in sub-
jective probability of living to age 751 reduces 
the probability of smoking by about 2.3 to 2.7 
percentage points. As the percent of respondents 
who smoke is 22.6 percent (see Table A1), these 
represent decreases of 10 to 12 percent.
In contrast, for heavy drinking we obtain point 
estimates that are insignificant and of the wrong 
16 While the six parental age polynomial coefficients are 
not individually significant, their joint F-test is 10.07 in col-
umn 1 and 9.90 in column 2.VOL. 97 NO. 2 57 TESTING ThE MEChANISMS Of STRuCTuRAL MODELS
Table 1—First-Stage IV Regression Results: Predicting Life Expectancy§
Dependent variable: Subjective probability of living to age 75
1
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Health factor 1 211.058***
(0.242)
Health factor 2 0.693***
(0.228)
Health factor 3 2.720***
(0.233)
Health factor 4 0.662***
(0.258)











































































Age of mother ^ 2 0.005
(0.009)
0.003
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sign. The evidence for high BMI is mixed. The 
point estimates are quantitatively large (at least 
half as great as for smoking) and of the right 
sign, but only marginally significant at best.
III.  Conclusion
We have argued that testing the latent mecha-
nisms of structural models, independent of full-
blown structural estimation, can be a valuable 
model validation tool. This perspective has the 
benefit that it can potentially rationalize much 
of the descriptive or IV-based empirical work 
being done in economics as contributing to the 
structural research program. As an example of 
this idea, we attempt to find evidence for the 
“Mantle effect” that plays a key role in Khwaja’s 
(2001) structural model of investment in health. 
We find clear evidence for the effect with respect 
to smoking, but mixed evidence with respect to 
heavy drinking and high BMI.
Table 2—Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results






















Subj. prob. of living 
  to age 751
  20.0010*** 
  (0.0001)
  20.0009*** 
  (0.0001)
  20.0001*** 
  (0.00004)




  0.00006 
  (0.0001)
R–squared   0.05   0.07   0.03   0.03   0.06   0.09
Observations   43,963   43,963  44,238 44,238 44,238 44,238
Notes: Huber-White standard errors are in brackets, clustered at respondent level. Wave and birth region dummies are 
included but coefficients are not shown.
1 All the health indicators listed in Table A1 are included, but their coefficients are not shown.
*** Significant at, or below, 1 percent.
  ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent.
    * Significant at, or below, 10 percent.


















Partial R-squared (identifying instruments) 0.021 0.022
F-test for excluded instruments 23.19 24.06
Notes: Huber-White standard errors are in brackets, clustered at respondent level. Wave and birth region fixed effects are 
included but not shown.
§ The table reports first stage results for the sample used in the smoking regression, which has 43,963 observations. 
First stage results for heavy drinking and high BMI are very similar, as the sample size is increased to only 44,238. 
   
+ All the health indicators in Table A1 are included in the regression in column 2, but the coefficients are not shown. 
   
++ The omitted categories for the father and mother age at death dummies are mother still alive and father still alive.  
  
+++ Age in the age polynomials is either current age or age at death. 
*** Significant at, or below, 1 percent. 
  ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. 
    * Significant at, or below, 10 percent.
Dependent variable: Subjective probability of living to age 751
(1) (2)1
Independent variable Health factors Health variables
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